Dynamic project selection by Nikandrova, Arina & Pancs, R.
Dynamic Project Selection
Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs⇤
February 2017
Abstract
We study a normative model of an internal capital market that a company uses to
choose between its two divisions’ projects. Each project’s value is initially unknown
to all, but can be dynamically learned by the corresponding division. Learning can be
suspended or resumed at any time and is costly. We characterize an internal capital
market that maximizes the company’s expected cash flow.
Keywords: irreversible project selection
JEL codes: D82, D83, G320, G310.
1 Introduction
A corporate finance textbook (e.g., Webster, 2003, Chapter 12) would recommend that
a company invest in a project if and only if the project’s internal rate of return exceeds
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the cost of capital. If companies operated this way, their investment decisions would be
independent across projects within the company, conditional on the projects’ cash flows
being independent. In practice, such conditional independence is the exception rather
than the rule (Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010).
Investment decisions on projects with independent cash flows can be dependent for
two reasons: projects may be mutually exclusive, or the internal capital used to finance
these projects may be scarce. We use the term “internal capital market” to describe a
project-selection mechanism that deals with either situation. We are interested in the
design of an optimal internal capital market for environments with independent cash
flows.
We focus on the problem in which project values are initially unknown but can be
learned over time. Before deciding which project to finance, a company performs due
diligence on each project. The Universal Music Group faced such a situation in 2011.
Universal was considering two alternative projects: the purchase of EMI Music or the
purchase of Warner Music Group.1 Purchasing both was infeasible, if only because of
antitrust concerns. Assessing the profitability of each purchase required costly due dili-
gence by teams of lawyers, consultants, and accountants, who evaluated music catalogs,
potential synergies, and antitrust risks.
Universal has two divisions, in London and in New York. Since EMI is based in Lon-
don and Warner Music in New York, Universal could have charged the London division
with performing due diligence on the purchase of EMI and the New York division with
performing due diligence on Warner Music. We ask how Universal should have orches-
trated its divisions’ due diligence to maximize its expected cash flow.
We study Universal’s problem in an auction-like environment in which HQ (the head-
quarters) allocates an item (the requisite funds to pursue an acquisition) to one of two
divisions, denoted by D1 and D2. The value of each division’s project (the profitability
1See http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/bmg-and-universal-may-co-bid-for-warner-and-
emi/ and http://www.completemusicupdate.com/timeline-emisale/.
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of the acquisition) is either 0 or 1, and is distributed independently across the two divi-
sions. Initially, each division has a belief about its project’s value and revises this belief
as it learns (performs due diligence). At each instant, each division can learn at a cost.
Learning affects the arrival intensity of “good news,” which reveals the project’s value to
be 1. The alternative, “no news,” means that the project’s value can be either 0 or 1 and
causes the division to revise its value estimate downward.
HQ maximizes the expected cash flow, defined as the expected value of the winning
project net of both divisions’ expected cumulative costs of learning. HQ can directly con-
trol each division’s learning, observe learning outcomes, and select the winning project.
Thus, HQ’s problem is a stochastic-control optimal-stopping problem. This problem’s
solution—an optimal policy—is this paper’s contribution.
Figure 1 summarizes the optimal policy we identify (we claim no uniqueness) when
learning is cheap, which is the most interesting case. This policy is stationary and pre-
scribes, for every pair (x1, x2) of the two projects’ expected values, whether either division
should win immediately and, if not, which division should learn. Normalizing x2   x1,
four prescriptions are possible:
1. Division 2 wins immediately
D2 wins immediately whenever x1 and x2 are either both close to 0 or both close
to 1. In this case, since there is little uncertainty about each project’s value (probably
the same), learning is not worth the cost. D2 also wins immediately whenever x2 is
substantially larger than x1. In this case, since there is little uncertainty about the
fact that project 2’s value exceeds project 1’s value, learning is unlikely to affect the
decision regarding which project to select.
2. Division 2 learns
D2 learns alone when x1 6= x2; when x1 and x2 are close to each other (so that it
is highly uncertain which project is more valuable); and when both x1 and x2 are
far away from 0 and 1 (so that each project’s value is highly uncertain). Under
3
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Figure 1: The optimal policy’s prescription for each pair (x1, x2) of the project’s expected
values. The arrows indicate the direction inwhich the type profile is revised if the division
that learns observes no good news.
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these conditions, the need for information is so great that it is worthwhile to ask
D2 to learn first and to plan to ask D1 to learn later if D2 does not observe good
news. (Asking D2 to learn without ever planning to ask D1 is suboptimal, for such
learning, while costly, would not affect the optimal allocation.)
3. Both divisions learn
Both divisions learn simultaneously when x1 = x2 (i.e., both projects appear equally
valuable); when x1 and x2 are sufficiently large (i.e., learning by either division is
informative); andwhen x1 and x2 are bounded away from 0 and 1 (i.e., each project’s
value is sufficiently uncertain).
4. Division 1 learns
D1 learns alone when the values of x1 and x2 are complementary to those described
in cases 1–3. Then, by asking D1 to learn, HQ bets on having D1 observe the good
news. HQ is “insured” by D2, which does not learn, and whose project can be
selected if D1 observes no good news for a sufficiently long time.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. This section concludes with a literature
review. Section 2 sets up the problem. Section 3 solves for the optimal policy. Section 4
introduces and maps the bad-news technology case into the analyzed good-news tech-
nology case, thereby establishing that the derived results immediately apply to the for-
mer case, as well. Section 5 shows numerically that the effect of exponential discounting
is similar to that of costly learning, and that the introduction of discounting does not
qualitatively change the optimal policy for the undiscounted case. Section 6 concludes.
Auxiliary technical lemmas are in the Supplementary Appendix A.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to two literatures: the corporate finance literature on internal cap-
ital markets and the economic theory literature on irreversible project selection in the
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presence of uncertainty. The assumptions underlying our model of the internal capital
market are motivated by the vision described by Stein (1997).2 In particular, because in-
ternal capital is scarce (e.g., because of informational frictions associated with raising out-
side capital), not all profitable projects can be financed, and, so, HQ must ration. At the
same time, even unprofitable projects may end up being financed (e.g., because of HQ’s
empire-building tendencies); thus, HQ invests all available internal capital. Accordingly,
we assume that HQ selects exactly one project.
The existing literature on internal capital markets is predominantly positive. In addi-
tion to Stein (1997), it includes Harris and Raviv (1996), Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and
Stein (2000), de Motta (2003), and Inderst and Laux (2005). The only normative dynamic
model of an internal capital market that we are aware of is that of Malenko (2012). While
we focus on learning about, and selecting between, two given projects, Malenko (2012)
studies selection from dynamically arriving projects and does not model learning.
The economic theory literature on irreversible project selection can be interpreted as
modeling internal capital markets. The real-option approach, exemplified by the work
of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), assumes that the values of projects evolve exogenously. We
extend their approach to situations in which these values evolve endogenously, as a result
of learning.
Learning is the focus of multi-armed bandit problems (Bolton and Harris, 1999; Keller
et al., 2005; Klein and Rady, 2010; Forand, 2015), which model reversible project selec-
tion.3 A solution to a bandit problem is typically an index policy that always selects
the arm with the greatest value of the Gittins index. In particular, in an exponential-
bandit problem with two risky arms, the optimal policy prescribes selecting myopically,
the project with the highest expected value.4 The analogous policy of always learning
2For a textbook introduction to internal capital markets, see Tirole (2006, Section 10.5).
3In bandit problems, the irreversibility of selecting an arm—but only a safe arm—has been explored by
Murto and Valimaki (2011) and Rosenberg et al. (2007).
4Banks and Sundaram (1992) show that myopic strategies are uniquely optimal in the class of bandit
problems in which each of the independent arms generates rewards according to one of two reward distri-
butions (same for both arms). By contrast, Forand (2015) studies a bandit-like problem with maintenance
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about the project with the highest expected value is suboptimal in our setting.
Our problem is related to sequential hypothesis testing, first formulated by Wald
(1960). Shiryaev (2008, Chapter 4), Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, Section 23), and Presman
and Sonin (1990) provide modern textbook accounts. Our problem shares two critical
features with these testing problems. First, in our model, learning (the analogue of test-
ing) has an explicit flow cost. Second, this cost is no longer incurred as soon as—at some
optimally chosen time—one of the two projects is chosen.5
2 Model
Time is continuous and indexed by t   0. The time horizon is infinite.
Valuations
HQ holds an indivisible item and values it at zero. HQ allocates this item to one of two
divisions, indexed by i 2 N ⌘ {1, 2} and denoted by Di. Di’s valuation, vi 2 {0, 1}, is a
randomvariable with Pr {vi = 1} = Xi (0), for some prior belief Xi (0) 2 [0, 1]. Valuations
v1 and v2 are independent.
Learning
Each Di can acquire information about vi—that is, learn.6 At each time t, HQ allocates
a unit of learning intensity between the divisions. Di’s learning intensity is denoted by
ai (t) 2 [0, 1], with a1 (t) + a2 (t) = 1. The cumulative cost of learning incurred by Di up
to time t is c
R t
0 e
 rsai (s)ds, for some cost parameter c > 0 and discount rate r   0.
Di’s learning process {ai (t) | t   0}, denoted by ai, controls the arrival-intensity pro-
costs and finds, just as we do, that a decision maker may sometimes optimally pull a less auspicious arm.
5This switching off of the learning costs upon selecting a project also prevents us from mapping our
problem into a multi-armed bandit problem.
6Here and throughout, the bold typeface highlights a definition.
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cess {ai (t) vi | t   0} of a Poisson process
 
Naii (t) | t   0
 
, Naii (0) = 0.
7 Processes Na11
and Na22 are independent. The public event when N
ai
i (t) is incremented is called good
news (about vi). The event when N
ai
i (t) is not incremented is called no news. Because
event Naii (t) > 0 can occur only if vi = 1, the good news reveals vi = 1.
Define Xaii (t), Di’s time-t type, or belief, to be the expectation of vi conditional on the
information revealed up to time t under some learning process ai:
Xaii (t) ⌘ E
⇥
vi |
 
Naii (s) | 0  s  t
 ⇤
.
For any learning-process profile a ⌘ (a1, a2), the tuple Xa (t) ⌘
 
Xa11 (t) ,X
a2
2 (t)
 
is a
time-t type profile. By the Law of Iterated Expectations, Xa is a martingale.
For any dates t and t0 > t, Di’s type Xaii (t
0) is derived from Xaii (t) by application of
Bayes rule. By Bayes rule, Naii (t
0) > 0 implies Xaii (t
0) = 1, whereas Naii (t
0) = 0 implies
Xaii (t
0)
1  Xaii (t0)
=
Xaii (t)
1  Xaii (t)
e 
R t0
t ai(s)ds. (1)
An Optimal Policy
The environment is stationary, so no generality is lost by focusing on stationary poli-
cies. A (stationary) policy is a tuple (a, t), where a learning policy a ⌘ (a1, a2) maps
a type profile x ⌘ (x1, x2) into learning decisions (a1 (x) , a2 (x)) 2 [0, 1]2 with a1 (x) +
a2 (x) = 1; and where t is a stopping time that designates when the item is allocated,
always to the higher-type division. A policy (a, t) induces the type process denoted by
{Xa,t (t) | t   0}.
A policy (a, t) is admissible if the learning process {a (X (t)) | t   0}, induced by
the learning policy a, is predictable and integrable, and if, for every i 2 N and every
Xi (0) 2 [0, 1], the appropriately defined stochastic differential equation for the evolution
of the type process has a unique strong solution.
7Henceforth, superscript ai indicates that the superscripted process is conditional on learning process ai.
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A policy (a, t) and an initial type profile x induce HQ’s expected discounted cash
flow:
Jr (x, a, t) ⌘ E

 c
Z t
0
e rsds+ e rtmax
i2N
 
Xa,ti (t)
 | Xa,t (0) = x  , (2)
where the expectation is with respect to the induced type process {Xa,t (t) | t   0} . For
any initial type profile x, the value function is defined by
fr (x) ⌘ sup
a,t
Jr (x, a, t) , (3)
where the maximization is over all admissible policies. An optimal policy (ar⇤, tr⇤) is
defined to satisfy fr (x) = J (x, ar⇤, tr⇤) for all x. In the undiscounted case, we drop the
subscripts, so that f ⌘ f0 and (a⇤, t⇤) ⌘  a0⇤, t0⇤ .
3 An Optimal Policy
The optimal policy is characterized in Propositions 1, 2, and 3, depending on the cost of
learning. Proposition 3 describes the case with the richest learning dynamics—the case
that prevails when the cost of learning is small. The optimal policy is inferred from the
value function, which solves an HJBQVI (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Quasi-Variational-
Inequality) equation. Because, in our case, the value function is nondifferentiable, the
appropriate solution concept imposes restrictions both where the function is differen-
tiable and where it is nondifferentiable, or has kinks.
3.1 The HJBQVI Equation
HJBQVI is the continuous-time counterpart of the Bellman equation for discrete-time set-
tings and, just like the Bellman equation, relies on the dynamic programming principle.
Lemma 1. For any type profile x 2 [0, 1]2 and any finite stopping time t0, the value function fr,
defined in (3), satisfies the recursive relationship that encompasses the dynamic programming
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principle (DPP):8
fr (x) = supa,t E

1{t t0}e rt
0
fr
 
Xa,t
 
t0
  
+ 1{t<t0}e rtmaxi2N
 
Xa,ti (t)
 
 c
Z t0^t
0
e rsds | Xa,t (0) = x
 
. (4)
Proof. The lemma’s conclusion follows from the DPP in Proposition 3.1 of Pham (1998).
A handful of inconsequential differences between Pham’s setup and ours are worth high-
lighting.
Pham’s focus on the finite-horizon problem is not restrictive for us because HQ’s max-
imal feasible surplus is 1; hence, the value function of the infinite-horizon problem can be
shown to be the limit of a sequence of the value functions of finite-horizon problems.
Pham assumes that the intensity of the Poisson jump process is independent of the
state. By contrast, in our problem, the jump intensity, aX, depends on the state process,
X. Nevertheless, stochastic integration with respect to this more general jump process is
well-defined—which is all that matters for Pham’s argument.9
The argument does not require positive discounting; r = 0 is admissible.
The DPP says that HQ’s value today equals HQ’s expected discounted continuation
value at an arbitrary future stopping time t0 plus the expected discounted payoffs en-
joyed until that time. These intervening flow payoffs and the eventual continuation value
depend on the intervening controls, chosen to maximize HQ’s value today.
Relying on theDDP, one can characterize the value function fr as a solution toHJBQVI.
Here, we informally derive HJBQVI, which disciplines fr at the points of differentiability,
and a sufficient condition for fr not to contradict optimality at kinks (i.e., whenever the
function is nondifferentiable). This sufficient condition is that all kinks be convex. A con-
vex kink of fr at x admits a smooth function that passes through x and lies weakly below
8Operator ^ is the binary min operator.
9Process X is a finite-variation process. Hence, the stochastic integral with respect to X is well-defined,
as a path-by-path Riemann-Stieltjes integral (see, e.g., Protter, 1990, Chapter I.6).
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fr.10
In discrete time, with a period length D > 0, the value function fr would be charac-
terized by the Bellman equation:11
fr (x) = x1_ x2_maxq
(
 Dc+ e rD
"
fr
⇣
xqD
⌘
+
⇣
1  fr
⇣
xqD
⌘⌘ 
1 ’
i2N
⇣
1  xi
⇣
1  e qiD
⌘⌘!#)
,
where q ⌘ (q1, q2) 2 [0, 1]2, subject to q1+ q2 = 1, is the allocation of the learning effort for
the duration of a period, and where xqD ⌘
⇣
xq1D1 , x
q2D
2
⌘
, with xqiDi being the type revised
down from xi according to (1). When D is small, the display above requires
rfr (x)    c+max
q
(
fr
 
xqD
   fr (x)
D
+ Â
i2N
qixi (1  fr (x))
)
, (5)
where the inequality is understood to be approximate, in the sense that the terms of order
D and smaller are omitted.
If fr is differentiable at x, taking the limit D ! 0 in (5) while using dxqiD/dD  D=0 =
 qixi (1  xi) (implied by Bayes rule in (1)) yields the HJB equation12
0   max
q
(
 rfr (x)  c+ Â
i2N
qixi (1  (1  xi) fri (x)  fr (x))
)
. (6)
Furthermore, because the maximand in (6) is linear in q, HJB in (6) is equivalent to
0   max
i2N
{ rfr (x)  c  xi (1  xi) fri (x) + xi (1  fr (x))} . (7)
10Formally, the solution concept for HJBQVI that characterizes the value function is the viscosity solution,
which disciplines the kinks. (The theory of viscosity solutions that encompasses our setting is covered by
Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 1997, and Oksendal and Sulem, 2005.) The argument presented here amounts
to showing that, for convex-kinked functions, the viscosity solution reduces to the satisfaction of HJBQVI
only at the points of differentiability. In this paper, we work only with convex-kinked functions; so, we do
not need to invoke the full-fledged theory of viscosity solutions.
11Operator _ is the binary max operator. For notational parsimony, we abuse the notation and do not
index fr by D.
12Subscripts denote partial derivatives: fri (x) ⌘ ∂fr (x) /∂xi. Simple derivatives are denoted by primes.
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If fr is not differentiable at x, then, before setting D! 0, we use a workaround—so as
not to lose any implication of optimality inherent in the Bellman equation, on account of
the nonexistence of the limit. Assume that, at x, fr has a convex kink. In this case, for the
workaround, take an arbitrary smooth function y—called a test function—that satisfies
y  fr and, at the kink x, satisfies y (x) = fr (x). The inequality in (5) is reinforced if one
replaces the first two appearances of fr with y:
rfr (x)    c+max
q
(
y
 
xqD
   y (x)
D
+ Â
i2N
qixi (1  fr (x))
)
.
Taking the limit D! 0 and noting that the resulting maximand is linear in q gives13
rfr (x)    c+max
i2N
{ xi (1  xi)yi (x) + xi (1  fr (x))} . (8)
The convexity of the kink at x implies that fri  (x)  yi (x)  fri+ (x).14 As a result,
inequality (8) at x is implied by (7) near x, where fr is differentiable.
To summarize the requirements for optimality, if every kink of a candidate value func-
tion is known to be convex (or if there are no kinks), then it suffices to verify that the
function solves HJBQVI at the points of differentiability. No implication of optimality
will be lost. That is how the analysis proceeds in this paper. We guess a value function
whose kinks are all convex and verify that, whenever differentiable, the guess solves the
HJBQVI equation:
0 = (x1   fr (x))_ (x2   fr (x))_max
i2N
{ rfr (x)  c  xi (1  xi) fri (x) + xi (1  fr (x))}
(9)
on W ⌘ (0, 1)2, subject to the boundary condition
fr (x) = x1 _ x2, x 2 ∂W, (10)
13When fr is differentiable at x, (8) reduces to (7).
14By convention, fri  and fri+ denote, respectively, the left and right derivatives with respect to xi.
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where ∂W is the boundary of W.
3.2 Maintained Parameter Restrictions and Conventions
For tractability, we neglect discounting: r = 0. Section 5 remarks on the case of r > 0.
The analysis focuses on the economically nontrivial case in which learning is suffi-
ciently cheap to be optimal for at least some type profiles:
c 2 (0, c¯) , where c¯ ⌘ 0.25.
The case with the richest learning dynamics is when the cost of learning is smaller still:15
c 2 (0, c) , where ln
 
1 pc 2
c
=
2
1 pc =) c ⇡ 0.047. (11)
By the problem’s symmetry, the optimal policy is also symmetric and, so, without loss
of generality, the formal arguments focus on the hyperplane defined by x2   x1.
3.3 Learning Is Prohibitively Costly
Proposition 1 shows that a sufficiently high c makes learning prohibitively costly. In-
tuitively, learning at a sufficiently high cost must be suboptimal because the gain from
allocating optimally—and, hence, from learning—is bounded.
Proposition 1. Suppose that learning is prohibitively costly, meaning that c   c¯. Then, the
higher-type division wins immediately. The induced value function is f (x) = x1 _ x2 = x2.
Proof. To verify that f is, indeed, the value function, first note that the kinks of f, all at
x1 = x2, are convex. Hence, it suffices to verify that f satisfies HJBQVI at the points of
differentiability. For this, substitute f (x) = x1 _ x2 = x2 into (9).
15To see that the solution of (11) is unique, note that left-hand side of (11) is strictly decreasing in c and
maps (0, c¯) onto R+, whereas the right-hand side is strictly increasing in c and maps (0, c¯) onto (2, 4), a
subset of R+.
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Figure 2: The optimal policy’s prescription for each type profile when the learning cost
is moderate; c1  cˆ < c2. Within the lens-shaped region, one of the divisions learns.
The arrows indicate the direction in which the type profile is revised if the division that
learns observes no news. Outside the lens-shaped region, no division learns, and the
highest-type division wins.
The quasi-variational inequality (QVI) f (x)   x1 _ x2 holds by construction.
The HJB that corresponds to D2’s learning is  c  0, which obviously holds.
The HJB that corresponds to D1’s learning is
 c+ x1 (1  x2)  0,
which holds for all x with x2 > x1 if and only if c   c¯. Indeed, the inequality’s left-hand
side is maximized at x1 = x2 = 1/2 and attains the value 1/4  c, which is non-positive
if and only if c   c¯.
3.4 Learning Is Moderately Costly
Assume that learning is moderately costly, meaning that c 2 [c, c¯). Then, Proposition 2
shows (and Figure 2 illustrates) that if x is such that there is sufficient uncertainty about
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the efficient allocation, then the lower-type division learns; otherwise, the higher-type
division wins immediately. Intuitively, asking the lower-type division to learn amounts
to betting that this division will observe good news. This bet is insured by HQ’s option
to allocate to the higher-type division if no good news arrives.
Now, we illustrate in some detail the arguments used in the more complex case of
cheap learning. Towards Proposition 2, guess that, for some threshold function b, x1 
b (x2) implies that D2 wins immediately, whereas x1 > b (x2) implies that D1 learns until
either good news arrives, or its revised type drops down to b (x2).16 The idea is that,
when x1 > b (x2), x1 and x2 are close to each other, the uncertainty about the identity of
the higher-value division is substantial, and, as a result, the return to learning is high.
Then, x1  b (x2) implies that f (x) = x1 _ x2 = x2. When x1 > b (x2), the value
function f—denoted by V on this set of type profiles—solves the HJB equation:
0 =  c  x1 (1  x1)V1 (x) + x1 (1 V (x)) , (12)
which picks out the component of HJBQVI that corresponds to D1’s learning. HJB (12)
is solved subject to the boundary condition V (b (x2) , x2) = x2. The boundary condition
captures the assumption that, once D1’s type has dropped down to b (x2) (because no
good news has arrived), no further learning occurs, and the higher-type division wins.
The solution is
V (x) = 1  c+ (1  x1)
✓
c ln
b (x2) (1  x1)
(1  b (x2)) x1  
1  x2   c
1  b (x2)
◆
. (13)
To determine b (x2) in (13), we solve the V-auxiliary problem: choose b (x2) in [0, x2]
to maximize V (x) in (13). Then, if interior on [0, x2], an optimal b (x2) satisfies the first-
order condition
b (x2) =
c
1  x2 . (14)
16Recall that we assume that x2   x1.
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Threshold b in (14) is, indeed, interior if x2 2 (x, x¯), where
x ⌘ 1 
p
1  4c
2
and x¯ ⌘ 1+
p
1  4c
2
. (15)
By c < c¯, interval (x, x¯) is nonempty.
We now show that the kinks of the constructed value function are convex. All kinks are
on the diagonal (i.e., the 45-degree line that passes through the origin). Off the diagonal,
kinks could potentially occur only at type profiles x = (b (x2) , x2) (indexed by x2), where
x1 _ x2 meets V (x). Differentiation ascertains, however, that segments x1 _ x2 and V (x)
paste together smoothly:
f1  (x) = f1+ (x) () ∂ (x1 _ x2)∂x1 = V1 (x)
f2  (x) = f2+ (x) () V2 (x) = ∂ (x1 _ x2)∂x2 .
The smooth pasting is a corollary to the optimality of b—an envelope-theorem result (Mil-
grom and Segal, 2002, Corollary 6).
By contrast, on the diagonal, each point is a kink. Among these, each kink x with
x1 = x2 2 [0, x) [ (x¯, 1] prescribes immediate allocation. Since, in its neighborhood, the
value function is x1 _ x2, all these kinks are convex, as in the case of prohibitively costly
learning.
A kink x with x1 = x2 2 (x, x¯) need not be convex in general but is convex when
f1  (x)  f2+ (x) () c   c, (16)
as we now proceed to show. To see that f1  (x)  f2+ (x) captures convexity, note that,
graphically, the convexity of a kink at x requires that, as one passes through x in the
direction of any vector v = (v1, v2) that traverses the diagonal from above (i.e., has a
slope between  3p/4 and p/4 radians), the corresponding directional derivative of the
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value function experiences a jump upwards (if at all):
v1f1  (x) + v2f2+ (x)  v1f1+ (x) + v2f2  (x) .
Further, by the symmetry of fwith respect to the diagonal, f1+ (x) = f2+ (x) and f2  (x) =
f1  (x). As a result, the inequality in the display above becomes
(v1   v2) (f1  (x)  f2+ (x))  0 () f1  (x)  f2+ (x) ,
where the equivalence follows from v1 > v2, which is dictated by the orientation of v.
The equivalence between f1  (x)  f2+ (x) and c   c follows from straightforward, if
tedious, algebraic manipulations (detailed in Lemma 2).
Lemma 2. The following are equivalent:
(i) For all x with x1 = x2 2 [x, x¯], f1  (x)  f2+ (x) and
(ii) c   c.
Proof. First, note that, at x with x1 = x2 2 [x, x¯], f1  (x) = V1 (x) and f2+ (x) = V2 (x).
Define D (z) ⌘ V2 (z, z)  V1 (z, z). We must show that D (z)   0 for all z 2 [x, x¯] if and
only if c   c. Substituting the functional forms, gives
D (z) = c
✓
1
z
+
1  z
1  c  z + ln
c (1  z)
z (1  c  z)
◆
.
Then, D (x) = D (x¯) = 1. Any critical point of D in (x, x¯) is characterized by the first-
order condition dD (z) /dz = 0, whose solutions are z⇤ = 1 pc and z⇤⇤ = p1  c. Of
these, only z⇤ is in (x, x¯). Thus, D is nonnegative on [x, x¯] if and only if it is nonnegative
at z⇤.
From
D (z⇤) = c
 
2
1 pc   ln
 
1 pc 2
c
!
,
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conclude that
D (z⇤)   0 () 2
1 pc   ln
 
1 pc 2
c
() c   c.
To recap, we have conjectured the optimal policy and the associated value function,
which has been verified to be convex-kinked. To validate the conjecture, it remains to
verify that f satisfies HJBQVI. The verification is split into two cases: x1  b (x2) and
x1 > b (x2).
• When x1  b (x2), f (x) = x1 _ x2 = x2, which, by construction, satisfies the QVI
f (x)   x1 _ x2.
The HJB that corresponds to D1’s learning is  c+ x1 (1  x2)  0, which is implied
by x1  b (x2).
The HJB that corresponds to D2’s learning is  c  0, which obviously holds.
• When x1 > b (x2), f = V, which, by construction, satisfies the HJB that corresponds
to D1’s learning.
QVI V (x)   x2 holds by the optimality of b.
QVI V (x)   x1 is implied by V (x)   x2 and (by convention) x2   x1.
The HJB that corresponds to D2’s learning requires that
 c  x2 (1  x2)V2 (x) + x2 (1 V (x))  0.
By the envelope theorem applied to (13), V2 (x) = (1  x1) / (1  b (x2)). Substitut-
ing V2 (x) and V (x) into the display above and dividing by  c (1  x2) gives the
equivalent inequality
FA (x, c) ⌘ 1  c  x1x2
1  c  x2 + x2
1  x1
1  x2 ln
c (1  x1)
x1 (1  c  x2)   0. (17)
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By part (iii) of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, (17) holds if and only if c   c.
Because f is convex-kinked and satisfies HJBQVI, Proposition 2 follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose that learning is moderately costly, meaning that c 2 [c, c¯). Then, if
x1 > b (x2), the lower-type division, D1, learns and, if it observes good news, wins. If x1  b (x2),
D2 wins immediately.
The economic content of condition c   c in Proposition 2 is the suboptimality of learn-
ing by D2, the higher-type division. What FA (x, c)   0 in (17) expresses and c   c
guarantees is that a one-off (literally, infinitesimal) deviation towards learning by D2 is
unprofitable.
3.5 Learning is Cheap
Assume that c < c. Then, Proposition 3 shows that it may also be optimal for D2, the
higher-type division, to learn. Intuitively, it is suboptimal to ask D2 to learn when the
intended period of learning is insufficiently long to flip the ranking of the divisions’ re-
vised types; such learning would not affect the allocation decision, but would entail a
wasteful learning cost. Lengthy learning is only ever justified, however, if it is sufficiently
cheap—which, here, means that c < c —and if the gains from learning are sufficiently
large. These gains are large when x1 and x2 are close to each other (so that the identity of
the more valuable project is highly uncertain); when both x1 and x2 are far away from 0
and 1 (so that each project’s value is highly uncertain); andwhen x1 and x2 are rather large
(so that learning is rather informative; the good news arrives with a high probability, and
if it does not arrive, then the type is revised downwards fast).
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal policy. For the type profiles in the heart-shaped region,
the higher-type division learns. Elsewhere in the lens-shaped region, the lower-type divi-
sion learns. On the diagonal that traverses the heart-shaped region, both divisions learn
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(a) c = 0.035.
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(b) c = 0.015.
Figure 3: The optimal policy’s prescription for each type profile when learning is cheap:
c < c. Within the lens-shaped region (which encompasses the heart-shaped region), at
least one of the divisions learns. Each arrow indicates the direction in which the type
profile is revised if the division that learns observes no news. Outside the lens-shaped
region, no division learns, and the higher-type division wins immediately.
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(a) OnF , instead of asking the lower-type division
to learn (as Proposition 2 would have it), HQ can
achieve a higher payoff bymomentarily asking the
higher-type division to learn and then reverting to
asking the lower-type division to learn.
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because linked 
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than one-off ones.
x2
x1
F
(b) The heart-shaped region on which Proposi-
tion 3 prescribes that the higher-type division
learns exceeds F .
Figure 4: The policy prescribed by Proposition 2 is no longer optimal when c < c.
simultaneously.17 If neither division learns, the higher-type division wins immediately.
The boundary of the lens-shaped region is demarcated by b defined in (14). The boundary
of the heart-shaped region is derived in the remainder of this section.
The (rather technical) intuition for the heart-shaped region in Figure 3 can be gleaned
from studying the set of type profiles on which c < c causes the verification of the con-
jectured value function in Proposition 2 to fail by causing some kinks to be non-convex.
That is, we are interested in the failure set
F ⌘
n
x | FA (x, c) < 0
o
, (18)
onwhich theHJB component that corresponds to D2’s learning fails in Proposition 2when
c < c. Figure 4a illustrates F (and, by the problem’s symmetry, its reflection about the
diagonal), which is heart-shaped. On F , infinitesimal learning by D2 followed by D1’s
17This simultaneous learning is not non-generic.
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Figure 5: Each of the sets I , V , A, B, and C collects the type profiles at which the optimal
policy makes identical prescriptions. Set A is bounded by curve u above and by curve d
below. Set B is bounded by curve w above and by the diagonal below. Set V is bounded
by curve b above and to the left. D2 learns on A and B. Both divisions learn on C. D1
learns on V . D2 wins immediately on I .
learning is a profitable deviation from the policy in which only D1 learns, as in Propo-
sition 2. Proposition 3 “patches” the failure set F by making the higher-type division
learn on a heart-shaped region that covers F . The region on which the higher-type divi-
sion learns according to Proposition 3 exceeds F (see Figure 4b) because one can chain
together infinitesimal deviations to obtain a deviation that is profitable even at a type
profile at which a single infinitesimal deviation is unprofitable.
The optimal policy is formally described in terms of five type-profile sets, or regions:
A, B, C, I , and V . There regions are depicted in Figure 5. Region I is the region on
22
which D2 wins immediately in Proposition 2. Region V is the region on which D1 leans in
Proposition 2 less A, B, and C. To characterize A, B, and C, we consider three auxiliary
stopping problems: A-auxiliary, B-auxiliary, and C-auxiliary.
The C-auxiliary problem is defined on the subset
Cˆ ⌘
n
(x1, x2) 2 [0, 1]2 | x  x1 = x2  x¯
o
of the diagonal. In the C-auxiliary problem, both divisions learn until either one observes
the good news or until both revised types drop down to some optimally chosen threshold,
denoted by a—whichever happens first. At a, the strategy described in Proposition 2 is
followed: D1 learns. Let C denote the value function of the C-auxiliary problem.
While both divisions learn, along the diagonal (z, z) indexed by z, the value function
satisfies the HJB equation
0 =  c  z (1  z) C
0 (z)
2
+ z (1  C (z)) , z 2 [x, x¯] ,
subject to C (a) = V (a, a). To find the optimal a, first solve the differential equation in the
display above for an arbitrary a: C (a) = V (a, a). The solution is
C (z) = 1+ (1  z)2
0BBBB@2cs (a)  1 V (a, a)(1  a)2| {z }
⌘MC(a)
  2cs (z)
1CCCCA , (19)
where V is defined in (13), and
s (s) ⌘ 2s
1  s +
1
2
✓
s
1  s
◆2
+ ln
s
1  s , s 2 (0, 1) .
The threshold amaximizes C over a and satisfies the first-order condition dMC (a) /da =
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0, where MC is defined in (19). Equivalently, by
dMC (a)
da
=
cFC (a, c)
a (1  a)2 , where F
C (a, c) ⌘ FA (a, a, c) , (20)
the threshold a satisfies FC (a, c) = 0.
Lemma 3 characterizes the solution of the C-auxiliary problem in terms of the thresh-
olds
a ⌘ min
n
a 2 [x, x¯] | FC (a, c) = 0
o
and (21)
a¯ = max
n
a 2 [a, x¯] | MC (a) = MC (a)
o
, (22)
and the type subset
C ⌘  (z, z) 2 Cˆ | z 2 (a, a¯) . (23)
Lemma 3. On C, D1 and D2 both learn; C is given by (19) with a = a. On Cˆ\C, D1 learns
as in Proposition 2; C coincides with V.
Proof. To solve maxa2[q,z] MC (a), let us examine the shape of MC on [x, x¯]; Figure 6 pre-
views MC.
By (20), the sign of dMC (a) /da coincides with the sign of FC (a, c). By Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A, FC (·, c) is positive at first, then intersects zero at a point, then is negative,
then intersects zero at a point, and then is positive again. As a result, MC is wave-shaped,
with local maxima at a, where a is the smallest of the two roots of FC (·, c) = 0, and
at x¯. Furthermore, by Lemma A.2 in Appendix A, x¯ is the unique global maximum:
MC (x¯) > MC (a).
Lemma A.2 and the wave shape of MC imply the existence of a unique a¯ 2 (a, x¯) such
that MC (a¯) = MC (a), as defined in (22).
The described properties of MC have the following implications for the C-auxiliary
problem. When z /2 (a, a¯), argmaxa2[x,z] MC (a) = {z}, and, so, C (z) = V (z, z); D1
learns. When z 2 (a, a¯), argmaxa2[x,z] MC (a) = {a}, and, so, C (z) > V (z, z); D1 and D2
24
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Figure 6: MC, the maximand in the C-auxiliary problem. The sign of dMC/da coincides
with the sign of FC (·, c).
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learn simultaneously until either division observes the good news or until both divisions’
types fall to a, whereupon (say) D1 learns.
To characterize set A, we formulate the A-auxiliary problem on the set
Aˆ ⌘ {(x1, x2) 2 (a⇤, a]⇥ [0, 1] | x2   x1} .
In this problem, either D1 learns as in Proposition 2, or D2 learns until either it observes
good news, or its revised type reaches some optimally chosen threshold, denoted by
d (x1). At that threshold, the strategy described in Proposition 2 is followed: D1 learns.
Let A denote the value function of the A-auxiliary problem.
While D2 learns, the associated value function satisfies the HJB equation
0 =  c  x2 (1  x2) A2 (x) + x2 (1  A (x)) , x 2 Aˆ, (24)
subject to A (x1, d (x1)) = V (x1, d (x1)). To find the optimal d (x1), first let us solve the
differential equation in the display above for an arbitrary a: A (x1, a) = V (x1, a). The
solution is
A (x1, x2) ⌘ 1+ (1  x2)
0BBB@ch (a)  1 V (x1, a)1  a| {z }
⌘MA(x1,a)
  ch (x2)
1CCCA , (25)
where
h (s) ⌘ s
1  s + ln
s
1  s , s 2 (0, 1) .
For each x1, d (x1)maximizes A over a and satisfies the first-order conditionMA2 (x1, d (x1)) =
0, where MA is defined in (25). Equivalently, by
MA2 (x1, x2) =
cFA (x, c)
x2 (1  x2) ,
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d (x1) satisfies FA (x1, d (x1) , c) = 0.
Lemma 4 characterizes the solution to the A-auxiliary problem in terms of the type
subset
A ⌘ {x 2 (a⇤, a]⇥ [0, 1] | x2 2 (d (x1) , u (x1))} , (26)
where
a⇤ ⌘ min
n
x1 2 [0, 1] | 9x2 2 [x1, 1] s.t. FA (x1, x2, c) = 0
o
, and (27)
d (x1) ⌘ min
n
a 2 [x1, 1] | FA (x1, a, c) = 0
o
, x1 2 (a⇤, a¯) , (28)
and, letting b 1 denote the inverse of b in (14),
u (x1) ⌘ max
n
a 2
h
x1, b 1 (x1)
i
| MA (x1, a) = MA (x1, d (x1))
o
, x1 2 (a⇤, a¯) . (29)
Lemma 4. On A, D2 learns; A is given by (25) with a = d (x1). On Aˆ\A, D1 learns as
in Proposition 2; A coincides with V. Moreover, on A, A   V; F \ Aˆ ⇢ A; and, for
x1 2 (a⇤, a), u (x1) < b 1 (x1).
Proof. To solve maxa2[x1,x¯] M
A (x1, a), let us examine the shape of MA.
By (17), the sign ofMA2 (x) coincideswith the sign ofF
A (x, c). By part (iv) of LemmaA.1
in Appendix A, FA (x1, ·, c) is quasi-convex; thus, MA (x1, ·) is wave-shaped, as depicted
in Figure 7.
Because FA (x1, ·, c) is quasi-convex, it intersects zero at most twice, in which case the
first intersection is a local maximum of MA. We denote this local maximum by d (x1),
defined in (28). This local maximum is not global; Lemma A.3 in Appendix A implies
that MA (x1, d (x1)) < MA
 
x1, b 1 (x1)
 
.
Thewave shape ofMA (x1, ·) implies the existence of a unique u (x1) 2
 
d (x1) , b 1 (x1)
 
such that MA (x1, u (x1)) = MA (x1, d (x1)), as in (29).
27
�� �(��)�(��) �-�(��)��
��(���·)
Figure 7: MA, the maximand in the A-auxiliary problem. The sign of MA2 (x1, ·) coincides
with the sign of FA (x1, ·, c).
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The derived properties of MA have the following implications for the maximization
problem maxa2[x1,x2] M
A (x1, a). When x2 /2 (d (x1) , u (x1)), MA (x1, ·) is maximized on
[x1, x2] at x2, and A (x) = V (x). When x2 2 (d (x1) , u (x1)), MA (x1, ·) is uniquely max-
imized on [x1, x2] at d (x1), and A (x) > V (x). Thus, on A, A   V, as claimed in the
“moreover” part of the lemma.
To complete the “moreover” part of the lemma, note that, because the slope ofMA (x1, ·)
coincides with the sign of FA (x1, ·, c), the shape of MA (x1, ·), summarized in Figure 7,
implies that F \ Aˆ ⇢ A.
Finally, by Lemma A.3, argmaxa2[x1,b 1(x1)]M
A (x1, a) =
 
b 1 (x1)
 
, which, together
with the wave shape of MA (x1, ·), implies that u (x1) < b 1 (x1).
To characterize set B, we formulate the B-auxiliary problem, defined on the set
Bˆ ⌘
n
(x1, x2) 2 (a, a¯)⇥
h
0, b 1 (x1)
i
| x2   x1
o
.
In the B-auxiliary problem, either D1 immediately learns, as in Proposition 2, or D2 learns
until it observes good news or until its revised type reaches x1, whereupon both divisions
learn as prescribed by the C-auxiliary problem. Let B denote the value function of the
B-auxiliary problem.
When only D2 learns, the associated value function satisfies the HJB equation
0 =  c  x2 (1  x2) B2 (x) + x2 (1  B (x)) (30)
subject to B (z, z) = C (z) for each z 2 [a, a¯]. The solution is
B (x) ⌘ 1  (1  x2)
✓
1  C (x1)
1  x1 + ch (x2)  ch (x1)
◆
. (31)
Because the threshold at which D2 stops learning is assumed to be x1, it remains only
to identify the threshold, denoted by w (x1), such that D2 does not learn if x2   w (x1).
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This threshold is
w (x1) ⌘ min
n
a 2
h
x1, b 1 (x1)
i
| V (x1, a) = B (x1, a)
o
, x1 2 (a, a¯) . (32)
Lemma 5 summarizes the solution to the B-auxiliary problem in terms of the type
subset
B ⌘ {(x1, x2) 2 (a, a¯)⇥ [0, 1] | x2 2 (x1,w (x1))} , (33)
where a, a¯, and w are defined in (21), (22), and (32), respectively.
Lemma 5. On B, D2 learns; B is given by (31) and satisfies B > V, and w (x1) < b 1 (x1). On
Bˆ\B, D1 learns as in Proposition 2; B coincides with V.
Proof. The proof is in the text above, except for the claim that w (x1) < b 1 (x1), which is
Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.
We can now assemble the pieces to form the conjectured value function when learning
is cheap:
f (x) = 1{x2A}A (x) + 1{x2B}B (x) + 1{x2C}C (x) + 1{x2V}V (x) + 1{x2I}x2. (34)
Function f is extended to the hyperplane x2 < x1 by the symmetry about the 45-degree
line.18 Function f has kinks where setsA and V meet at curve u, where sets B and V meet
at curve w, and on the 45-degree line outside the heart-shaped region in Figure 5. The
kinks at these boundaries comply with the rule of thumb of Peskir and Shiryaev (2006,
Chapter IV.9): whenever the type process is certain to move away from a boundary, the
value function at the boundary is liable to be nondifferentiable. Alternatively, here, all
the kinks of f are at the boundaries that have not been explicitly determined as solutions
18The value function in (34) also describes the intermediate-cost case, in which A, B, and C are empty,
and the prohibitive-cost case, in which V is empty, as well.
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to optimal stopping; thus, at those boundaries, the envelope theorem does not guarantee
smooth pasting.
To verify the conjecture in (34), we must perform the same two-step procedure that
leads to Proposition 2: verify that f’s kinks are convex, and verify that f solves HJBQVI.
The requisite steps are contained in the proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that learning is cheap, meaning that c < c. Then, on A and B, the
higher-type division, D2, learns and, if it observes good news, wins. On V , D1 learns and, if it
observes good news, wins. On I , D2 wins immediately.
Proof. The the proof proceeds in steps collected into three groups. Step 1 is concerned
with the convexity of kinks. Step 2 is concerned with the satisfaction of the QVIs. Step 3
is concerned with the satisfaction of the HJB equations.
Step 1.1: By the argument leading up to Proposition 2, there are no kinks at the bound-
ary of I and V .
Step 1.2: It will be shown that there are no kinks whereA and V meet along d. Indeed,
A2 (x1, d (x1)) = 1  x1   c (1  x1)1  d (x1) ln
c (1  x1)
x1 (1  c  d (x1))  
c
d (x1)
=
(1  d (x1)) (1  x1)
1  c  d (x1) = V2 (x1, d (x1)) ,
where the first equality follows by differentiating A; the second equality usesFA (x1, d (x1) , c) =
0 (from the definition of d) to substitute out the logarithmic term; and the third equality
follows by differentiating V. Furthermore, direct differentiation (without using the con-
dition for d) establishes that A1 (x) = V1 (x), including at x = (x1, d (x1)). Thus, there are
no kinks where A and V meet along d.
Step 1.3: It will be shown that there are no kinks where A and B meet, a vertical
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boundary. We shall ascertain that A1 (x) = B1 (x) along that boundary. Indeed,
A1 (x) =
1  x2
1  d (x1)V1 (x1, d (x1))
=
x1!a
1  x2
1  a V1 (a, a)
=
1  x2
1  a
✓
1  a  c
a
  c ln c (1  a)
a (1  c  a)
◆
,
where the first equality follows by the envelope theorem (d (x1) has been chosen opti-
mally); the second equality uses limx1!a d (x1) = a; and the last equality is by differenti-
ation and rearranging.
Further,
B1 (x) = (1  x2)
 
C0 (x1)
1  x1  
1  C (x1)
(1  x1)2
+ ch0 (x1)
!
=
(1  x2) (1  C (x1)  c/x1)
(1  x1)2
=
x1!a
1  x2
1  a
✓
1  a  c
a
  c ln c (1  a)
a (1  c  a)
◆
,
where the first equality is by differentiation; the second equality is by h0 (x1) = 1/
⇣
x1 (1  x1)2
⌘
and by
C0 (z) = 2 (1  C (z)  c/z)
1  z ;
and the final equality follows by substituting C. As a result, A1 (a, x2) = B1 (a, x2) for
x2 2
 
a, b 1 (a)
 
.
Step 1.4: It will be shown that there are no kinks where B meets its reflection about
the diagonal, on C. Indeed,
B1 (z, z) =
1  C (z)  c/z
1  z = B2 (z, z) ,
where the first equality follows by the computations in Step 1.2, and the second equality
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follows by differentiation.
Step 1.5: It will be shown that the kinks where V meets its reflection about the 45-
degree line, on Cˆ\C, are convex. By Lemma 2, it must be shown that V1 (z, z)  V2 (z, z)
for (z, z) 2 Cˆ\C.
V1 (z, z) = 1  z  cz   c ln
c (1  z)
z (1  c  z)
V2 (z, z) =   (1  z)
2
1  c  z .
Rearranging implies that V1 (z, z)  V2 (z, z) is equivalent to FC (z, c)   0, which is im-
plied by Lemma A.1.
Step 1.6: It will be argued that the kinks where V meetsA along u are convex. Indeed,
the surfaces constructed in the A-auxiliary and the V-auxiliary problems, characterized by
A and V, are both smooth. As x2 increases, the A-induced surface cuts into the V-induced
surface from above, by construction, and because u (x1) < b 1 (x1) (Lemma A.3). Thus,
the kinks along u are convex.
Step 1.7: It will be argued that the kinks where V meets B along w are convex. Indeed,
the surfaces constructed in the B-auxiliary and the V-auxiliary problems, characterized by
B and V, are both smooth. As x2 increases, the B-induced surface cuts into the V-induced
surface from above, by construction, and because w (x1) < b 1 (x1) (Lemma A.4). Thus,
the kinks along w are convex.
Step 2.1: On I and V , the QVIs follow by the arguments leading up to the proof
of Proposition 2 because the specification of f on I [ V is the same here and in that
proposition.
Step 2.2: On A, the QVI requires that A (x)   x1 _ x2 = x2. Inequality A (x)  
V (x) follows by the optimality of stopping—or, as we say, by revealed preference (of
the maximizer)—in the A-auxiliary problem. Inequality A (x)   x2 follows by revealed
preference in the V-auxiliary problem. Combining the preceding two inequalities gives
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A (x)   x2.
Step 2.3: On B, the QVI requires that B (x)   x2. To verify the inequality, first, extend
the A-auxiliary problem (originally defined on A) to B. Using the same arguments as in
Lemma 4, this problem’s solution can be verified to imply that, on B, D2 learns until either
he observes the good news or his belief drops down to x1, at which point the prescription
of the V-auxiliary problem is followed and delivers continuation value V (x1, x1). By re-
vealed preference, on B, A (x)   V (x) (where A is the value function of the A-auxiliary
problem extended to B). Moreover, on B, the B-auxiliary problem has the same thresh-
old (x1, by assumption) as the A-auxiliary problem extended to B (x1, now as a result).
But once this threshold has been reached, it delivers a higher continuation value, C (x1),
which satisfies C (x1)   V (x1, x1) by revealed preference in the C-auxiliary problem. So,
on B, B (x)   A (x), which, combined with A (x)   V (x)   x2, gives B (x)   x2, as
desired.
Step 2.4: On C, the QVI requires that C (z)   z. Inequality C (z)   V (z, z) follows
by revealed preference in the C-auxiliary problem. Inequality V (z, z)   z follows by re-
vealed preference in the V-auxiliary problem. Combining the preceding two inequalities
gives C (z)   z.
Step 3.1: On I , the HJBs for D1 and for D2 hold by the argument in the proof of
Proposition 2.
Step 3.2: On V , the HJB for D1, (12), holds by construction.
HJB for D2 holds if and only if FA (x, c)   0, as was established in the discussion
preceding (17). Recall that FA (x, c) < 0 () x 2 F . Because F ⇢ A [ B (on Aˆ, F ⇢ A
by Lemma A.3; on Bˆ, F ⇢ B by Lemma A.4) and V \ (A [ B) = ? (by the definition of
V), x 2 V implies that x /2 F . As a result, FA (x, c)   0 for all x 2 V , as desired.
Step 3.3: On A, the HJB for D2, (24), holds by construction.
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The HJB for D1 is
  c  x1 (1  x1) A1 (x) + x1 (1  A (x))  0. (35)
By the Envelope Theorem applied to A in (25),
A1 (x) =
(1  x2)V1 (x1, d (x1))
1  d (x1) .
Substituting the display above and the definition of A in (25) into (35) and dividing by c
yields
x1 (1  x2) (h (x2)  h (d (x1)))
+
x1 (1  x2)
c (1  d (x1)) [1 V (x1, d (x1))  (1  x1)V1 (x1, d (x1))]  1,
which further simplifies by substituting V from (13) and V1 from (12) and by dividing
both sides by 1  x2:
1
1  x2   x1 (h (x2)  h (d (x1))) +
1
1  d (x1) . (36)
If x2 = d (x1), then (36) holds trivially, as equality. To show that (36) also holds for
x2 > d (x1), it suffices to show that its left-hand side increases in x2 faster than its right-
hand side does. Indeed, by x1 < x2, the left-hand side’s derivative, 1/ (1  x2)2, exceeds
the right-hand side’s derivative, x1/
⇣
x2 (1  x2)2
⌘
. Thus, (36) is verified.
Step 3.4: On B, the HJB for D2, (30), holds by construction.
The HJB for D2 is
  c  x1 (1  x1) B1 (x) + x1 (1  B (x))  0. (37)
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Differentiating B in (31) and using the expression for C0 (x1) gives
B1 (x) =
1  x2
(1  x1)2
✓
1  C (x1)  cx1
◆
.
Substituting the display above and the definition of B in (31) into (37) leads to inequality
(36) with d (x1) replaced by x1; that inequality was verified in the preceding step (for any
d (x1), including d (x1) = x1).
Because, by Steps 1, 2, and 3, f is convex-kinked and satisfies HJBQVI, the conclusion
of the proposition follows.
4 Alternative Learning Technologies
So far, we have assumed that both divisions operate the good-news technology (GNT),
which, when vi = 1, sometimes reveals the good news that vi = 1 but never reveals
vi = 0. Both from the conceptual standpoint and motivated by applications, one may
wonder about HQ’s optimal policy when both divisions operate the bad-news technol-
ogy (BNT), which, when vi = 0, sometimes reveals the bad news that vi = 0 but never
reveals vi = 1. Examples of the BNT are a clinical drug trial whose goal is to determine
whether a drug has serious side effects; a press investigation whose goal is to discover
a political candidate’s disqualifying trait; and a company’s due diligence about whether
the Department of Justice will block a merger.
It turns out that the BNT case is a corollary (Corollary 1) to the GNT case (of Proposi-
tions 1, 2, and 3). The key to the result is to observe that, by the symmetry of the two tech-
nologies, the benefit from learning optimally relative to allocating immediately with the
GNTwhen {Pr {vi = 1} = yi}i=1,2 is the same aswith the BNTwhen {Pr {vi = 0} = yi}i=1,2,
for any (y1, y2) 2 [0, 1]2. Formally, denoting by w the value function for the BNT case, the
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(a) D1 and D2 each operates the bad-news technol-
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(b) D1 operates the good-news technology (GNT);
D2 operates the bad-news technology (BNT).
Figure 8: Optimal policies for bad-news and hybrid (good-news-bad-news) technologies;
c = 0.035. Each arrow indicates the direction in which the type profile is revised if the
division that learns observes no news. The region in which some agent learns is the same
for good-news (not shown), bad-news, and hybrid learning technologies.
symmetry between the GNT and BNT cases is captured by19
f (x) max {x1, x2} ⌘ w (1  x) max {1  x1, 1  x2} , (38)
where, as before, xi = Pr {vi = 1}, i = 1, 2. Roughly speaking, what matters for the
relative benefit of learning is how likely the states are that generate the news, not whether
these states correspond to high or low project values.
The observation in (38) implies that, graphically, the optimal-policymap for the BNT is
obtained from the optimal-policy map for the GNT (Figure 3a) by reversing the direction
of each axis and by swapping the two divisions’ areas for immediate allocation. Figure 8a
illustrates.
Corollary 1. Optimal policies for the BNT and the GNT are such that
19See the proof of Corollary 1 for more on this symmetry.
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1. Di learns with the BNT at a type profile x if and only if it learns with the GNT at the type
profile 1  x; and
2. At any type profile x, Di wins with the BNT if and only if it wins with the GNT.
Remark 1. The corollary’s conclusion does not survive discounting. For a rough intuition,
suppose that r > 0, and x is “large,” so that f (x) > w (1  x). Then, the opportunity cost
of learning—and, thus, delaying allocation—is higher at x with the GNT than at 1  x
with the BNT.
Proof. Let HJBQVI-GNT and HJBQVI-BNT stand for HJBQVI equations for good-news
and bad-news technologies, respectively.
Let w, given in (38), be a conjectured value function for the BNT case. Equivalently,
when x2   x1,
w (x) ⌘ f (1  x) + x1 + x2   1. (39)
By inspection of (39), the kinks of w inherit the properties of the corresponding kinks of
f and, so, are convex.
It remains to verify that w solves HJBQVI-BNT at the points of differentiability, or that
0 = max
i2N
{xi  w (x) , c+ xi (1  xi)wi (x) + (1  xi) (x i  w (x))}
holds. Substituting (39) into the display above and setting y = 1  x gives
0 = max
i2N
{y i   f (y) , c  yi (1  yi) fi (y) + yi (1  f (y))} ,
which is HJBQVI-GNT, satisfied by f.
The substitutions leading to the equivalence of HJBQVI-BNT andHJBQVI-GNT imply
that Di wins with the BNT at x whenever it would win with the GNT at x, and that Di
learns with the BNT at x whenever it would learn with the GNT at 1  x.
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Finally, one can conceive of a hybrid technology, with D1 operating the GNT and D2
operating the BNT. An example is a drug trial in which D1 tests an existing drug, known
to be safe, for off-label efficacy, whereas D2 tests a new drug, known to be efficacious,
for side-effects. Figure 8b illustrates the optimal policy. In this case, simultaneous learn-
ing occurs along the backward-bending diagonal segment. The region on which some
division learns is the same in all three learning technologies considered in the paper.
5 Discounting
So far, our analysis of the optimal policy has focused on the undiscounted problem. This
section suggests that the described results are robust to the introduction of discounting,
and that discounting affects the optimal policy in intuitive ways. The comprehensive
analysis of the discounted case is conceptually no different from the undiscounted one,
but its execution is beyond both our ability to perform algebraic manipulations and this
paper’s scope. To illustrate the optimal policy with discounting, we resort to numerical
analysis. Figure 9 illustrates the broad lessons.
According to Figure 9, an increase in the discount factor is qualitatively similar to an
increase in the cost of learning. In particular, as r rises, the region on which some division
learns (i.e., the lens-shaped region) shrinks.20 Furthermore, as r rises, the region on which
the higher-type division learns (i.e., the “heart”) also shrinks.
Discounting does not make simultaneous learning by both divisions more prevalent
than it is in the undiscounted problem. Formally, whenever differentiable at a type profile
x, the value function fr solves the HJB equation (6). Because the maximand in the HJB is
linear in q, the allocation of learning effort, an interior solution is never strictly optimal.
Discounting would favor simultaneous learning if the model were changed so that
learning capacity were division-specific instead of being fixed in the aggregate and al-
20This lens-shaped region is nonempty if and only if c < (1  r)2 /4, which is the analogue of c < c¯ in
Proposition 1 and is derived analogously.
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(b) The discounted case: r = 0.02.
Figure 9: The optimal policy’s prescription for each type profile when learning is cheap;
c = 0.035. Within the lens-shaped region, one of the divisions learns. Each arrow indi-
cates the direction in which the type profile is revised if the division that learns observes
no news. Outside the lens-shaped region, no division learns and the higher-type division
wins.
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located between the two divisions. In that case, HQ might tolerate the redundancy of
simultaneous learning in order to avoid the delay associated with sequential learning.
6 Conclusions
The paper solves the cash-flow maximization problem of a company that faces an irre-
versible project-selection decision with information acquisition about each project. In
practice, strategic decisions pertaining to project selection (e.g., a merger or an acquisi-
tion) constitute sensitive information, which companies guard against outsiders. This
lack of observability limits the scope for testing the model’s predictions and makes the
paper’s focus largely normative.
Nevertheless, one can tentatively ask the positive questions of whether the actions
assumed to be available to HQ are observed in practice, and whether HQ’s derived op-
timal strategy can rationalize observed outcomes. As noted in the Introduction, in 2011,
Universal Music Group was choosing between two projects: buying EMI Music and buy-
ing Warner Music Group. Industry rumors suggest that, initially, Universal was learning
about both projects simultaneously but quickly focused its efforts on learning about EMI.
Late in 2011, Universal announced that it would buy EMI; Universal’s consultants must
have gotten good news. Universal’s behavior is consistent with the model’s optimal pol-
icy for the case when learning is cheap, so that simultaneous learning can be optimal.
Thus, the actions of taking time to learn about projects and of learning either sequentially
or simultaneously were available to Universal.
The paper derives the optimal policy by assuming that HQ both directly controls di-
visions’ learning and observes divisions’ news, if any. What if HQ can do neither? The
optimal policy can still be implemented, in a dynamic auction. This auction is a special
case of the VCGmechanism’s dynamic extensions (see Athey and Segal, 2007, and Berge-
mann and Välimäki, 2010). Because of the good-news nature of the learning technology,
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our special case requires much less communication than a direct dynamic mechanism
would suggest for a general learning technology. In particular, the auction begins with
indicative bidding, followed by self-enforcing optimal learning by the divisions and then
firm bidding. Firm bidding occurs at a deadline that HQ sets given the indicative bids, or
as soon as either division calls for early firm bidding—whichever occurs first.21
A dynamic auction is a plausible implementation instrument in practice. Internal
auctions have been successfully deployed to predict sales (Hewlett-Packard), manage
manufacturing capacity (Intel), generate business ideas (General Electric), select market-
ing campaigns (Starwood), and predict project completion (Microsoft) or external events
(Google).22 The efficacy of an internal auction relies on the company’s ability to com-
mit to refraining from subsequently undoing any payments received from its divisions in
the course of the auction. One would expect the requisite commitment to be available to
successful companies with a developed reputation for executing cash-flow-maximizing
decisions.
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